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A B S T R A C T   
Israel’s West Bank settlements are a central point of contention in the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Overall, however, their rapid proliferation has been generally understood through the lens of an ideologically 
centered approach that highlights, specifically, the centrality of the national religious settlers’ movement. 
Against this background, the article focuses on the overlooked reality of large, state-sponsored suburban set-
tlements – and in particular on the role of the Israeli Ministry of Housing in their establishment between the mid- 
1970s and the early 1990s. Building on contributions in the field of political economy and political geography, 
we conceive the actions of the Ministry in the occupied West Bank as a result of a broader strategy of spatial 
restructuring. By considering both economic and political imperatives underlying this strategy, our analysis 
offers a more comprehensive assessment of the factors behind Israel’s settlement policy. Drawing on a broad 
range of empirical sources, from archival material to in-depth interviews with Israeli planners, we argue that the 
proliferation of settlements has been largely the outcome of a process of metropolitanization – i.e. of the dy-
namics of urban development of Israel’s main metropolitan centers and the adoption of a new, post-Keynesian 
policy paradigm based on market-oriented economic development. This process has constituted a major factor 
for the settlements’ growth and, ultimately, in the emergence and naturalization of a new territorial configu-
ration in the area of Israel/Palestine.   
1. Introduction 
On October 12, 1982, a ceremony marking the official population of 
the new town of Ma’ale Adumim, – today one of the largest Israeli set-
tlements in the West Bank, located only 8 km from the Old City of Je-
rusalem – was underway. The event’s guests of honor, Minister of 
Housing and Construction David Levy and the ministry’s Director- 
General Asher Weiner were accompanied by a group of reporters 
while they enjoyed a tour of the settlement’s new homes and facilities. 
The construction of the first 700 residential units had already been 
completed, and another 2000 units were at an advanced stage of con-
struction. Altogether, the projected plan of Ma’ale Adumim was 
comprised of 10,000 new residential units planned to house around 
35,000 residents. Immediately following their tour, which included a 
visit to the new stone buildings, the commercial center, and the city’s 
industrial zone, the Minister of Housing proudly declared that “Nothing 
can compare to the speed with which this modern city has been built,” 
and added that “the laying of infrastructure, paving of roads, and 
provision of public utilities’’ with which the Ministry had been entrus-
ted, will make it possible to “increase the rate of construction in Ma’ale 
Adumim as well as in other cities in Judaea and Samaria” (Avner, Yediot 
Aharonot, October 13, 1982: 23). 
The ceremony held in Ma’ale Adumim represents just an episode in 
the over five-decade-long expansion of the Jewish settlements in the 
Palestinian West Bank – occupied by Israel during the 1967 War along 
with the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. The founding of Ma’ale 
Adumim, however, epitomizes many of the crucial features of Israel’s 
settlement policy (hereafter ISP) as a whole: the establishment of several 
new planned towns in the regions of metropolitan Tel-Aviv and Jeru-
salem through large investments by the Ministry of Housing; the 
mobilization of state-of-the-art architectural and planning knowledge; 
and cooperation between the Ministry’s planners and private de-
velopers. The construction of thousands of housing units in these set-
tlements was part of a broader process of metropolitanization of Israel’s 
spatial development policies and answered the growing demand for 
affordable housing among Israel’s Jewish population. As a result, the 
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West Bank became one of the favorite destinations of young couples 
looking for quality housing at an affordable price right outside the 
increasingly crowded and expensive inner cities of Jerusalem and Tel 
Aviv. This influx of new residents marked the arrival of a diverse pop-
ulation into the settlements which dramatically altered their de-
mographic composition. Unlike the homogenous national-religious 
population that characterized the settlement project during its early 
stages (Peled & Shafir, 2002, pp. 165–172), the urban and metropolitan 
nature of these new settlements spawned a far more heterogeneous 
settler population than is often perceived. One that includes many 
secular and ethnically diverse families from different class backgrounds 
who had no previous connection with the religious-ideological settler 
movement. These included mizrahim (i.e., Jews of African or Middle 
Eastern descent), haredim (i.e. the so-called "ultra-orthodox Jews"), and 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Notably, these groups have 
become key participants in the settlement enterprise. 
This paper examines Israel’s settlement policy as a key engine for the 
process of “production of territory” (Brenner & Elden, 2009) which 
reshaped the legal, economic, infrastructural, and symbolic geography 
of post-1967 Israel/Palestine. It applies a theoretical apparatus rooted in 
political geography and, more specifically, spatial political economy to 
understand how this process unfolded. This paper mainly focuses on the 
role of the Israeli Ministry of Housing (hereafter MoH). Between the late 
1970s and the early 1980s, the MoH assumed a key role in steering the 
development of ISP, which we conceive as a set of “territorial strategies”, 
aimed at “mobilizing state institutions to shape and reshape inherited 
territorial structurations of political-economic life, including those of 
state institutions themselves” to “facilitate the production of the terri-
tory of the state, and often, in turn, that of the nation-state” (Brenner & 
Elden, 2009, pp. 368, 369) vis-à-vis broad political, economic and social 
processes. 
Our argument is twofold. First, our account shows that the ISP is at 
the same time the product of complementary factors, i.e. of its ideo-
logical and strategic drivers, as well as of wider socio-economic trends 
and of shifts in paradigms of territorial development. This paper focuses 
mainly on the importance of the latter in shaping the trajectory of the 
ISP and, ultimately, in consolidating the broad political legitimacy of 
Israel’s control over the territories conquered in 1967. Second, we argue 
that our case study can contribute to wider theoretical debates in po-
litical economy and political geography. In this respect, the develop-
ment of ISP serves as an example of the “historicity of the neoliberal 
state” (Hilgers, 2012) and of “variegated neo-liberalization” (Brenner, 
Peck, & Theodore, 2010), showing how the homogenizing effects of 
global trends can coexist with and are reflected in, the heterogeneity of 
the local; and how the dynamic of state restructuring is inherently linked 
to local struggles for political legitimacy (Purcell & Nevins, 2005). 
The findings discussed throughout this paper draws on various 
empirical sources. These include original archival documents collected 
from Israel’s State Archives, most of which were released as a result of 
this study. These materials pertain mainly to the MoH and document 
changes in settlement development policy in the first half of the 1980s. 
These sources are complemented by a dozen semi-structured interviews 
with Israeli planners, architects, and former senior officials from the 
MoH and Israel’s other planning agencies carried out between 2010 and 
2014. Finally, we supplement these data with official publications of the 
MoH, historical and more recent newspaper articles, data collected by 
Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, and numerous secondary sources. 
Before going further, some clarifications on the terminology are in 
order. We use the terms “settlements” and “settlers” to refer to all the 
Jewish communities (towns, villages, neighborhoods) founded by Israel 
in the West Bank after 1967 and their inhabitants, including the so- 
called “new neighborhoods” built in East Jerusalem. In referring to 
the metropolitan regions of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, many alternative 
definitions can be adopted (for Jerusalem see Allegra, 2013); our broad 
and somewhat flexible definition of “suburban settlements” refers to 
those relatively large communities (i.e. with a population of about 5000 
residents or more) located within a range of 20–30 km from the inner 
cities of Tel Aviv (e.g. Ariel, Karnei Shomron, Alfei Menashe, Emma-
nuel) and Jerusalem, both inside (French Hill, Neve Ya’akov, Gilo, 
Talpiot, Pisgat Ze’ev, Ramat Shlomo, Har Homa) and outside its 
municipal borders (Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev, Efrat, Beitar Illit, Geva 
Binyamin, Kokhav Ya’akov, Mod’in Illit) – see Fig. 1. A rough estimate 
would put the current number of settlers in the West Bank at around 650, 
000 (out of a total Israeli population of some nine million), of which 
more than 200,000 reside in East Jerusalem (Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 
2021). 
2. Israel settlement policy as a strategy of production of 
territory 
In the last two decades, many different scholars (Brenner & Elden, 
2009; Agnew, 2010, Painter, 2010 the special issue of Geopolitics 15:4) 
have tried to escape what John Agnew (1994) famously defined the 
“territorial trap” i.e. the ahistorical notion of territory which sees states 
as containers of specific sets of social and economic phenomena. Broadly 
speaking, this literature conceives territory as “necessarily porous, his-
torical, mutable, uneven and perishable. It is a laborious work in prog-
ress, prone to failure and permeated by tension and contradiction. 
Territory is never complete, but always becoming” (Painter, 2010: 
1094). Historically, new territorial configurations emerge from a pro-
cess of “production of territory” (Brenner & Elden, 2009; see also Alle-
gra, 2013) developing across the dimensions of Lefebvre’s triad of 
perceived, conceived and lived space. State territorial strategies, which 
mobilize “state institutions to shape and reshape inherited territorial 
structurations of political-economic life, including those of state in-
stitutions themselves” (Brenner & Elden, 2009: 368), are typically a key 
factor in this process. The idea of territorial strategy, however, does not 
refer to a Weberian understanding of the territory as coinciding with 
(and homogeneous to) state space and rather emphasizes how territory 
emerges through a complex process of governance, in which state and 
non-state actors (Agnew, 2010; Ballvé, 2012) and socio-technical prac-
tices (Painter, 2010) play a crucial role. Following this line of thought, 
we examine ISP as a territorial strategy that has greatly contributed to 
reformulate the political geography of post-1967 Israel/Palestine – see 
also (Schwake 2021c). 
In adopting an approach rooted in political geography and political 
economy, our work here and elsewhere (Allegra, 2013, 2016, 2017; 
Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 2017; Handel, Rand, & Allegra, 2015; 
Maggor, 2015) follows several pioneering contributions on ISP between 
the mid-1970s and the late 1980s by Israeli geographers such as Yuval 
Portugali and David Newman, and by the late Meron Benvenisti and his 
associates in the West Bank Data Project (M. Benvenisti, 1976, 1984; 
Newman, 1985; M. Benvenisti, Abu-Zayed, & Rubinstein, 1986; New-
man & Portugali, 1987; M. Benvenisti & Khayat, 1988; E. Benvenisti, 
1989; Newman, 1989; Portugali, 1991). This body of literature has been 
crucial in producing a first broad and holistic picture of ISP’s origins, 
development, and long-term implications for Israeli-Palestinian re-
lations (see also Demant, 1988; Harris, 1980; Lustick, 1988, 1993). 
Together with the numerous studies focusing on the settlers’ movement 
and its influence on Israeli policymaking (Aran, 1991, 2013; Aran & 
Feige, 1987; Friedman, 1992; Isaac, 1976; Newman & Hermann, 1992; 
Sprinzak, 1991; Weisburd, 1989), this literature represents the bulk of 
scholarly contributions on ISP in the two decades that followed the war 
of 1967. 
By the 1990s, however, the interest in the political geography and 
political economy of ISP had declined significantly. In the shadow of the 
Oslo process, the scholarly literature started to focus on the diplomatic 
and legal status of the settlements, while a growing number of local and 
international NGOs and agencies (e.g. Peace Now, B’Tselem, Bimkom, 
Human Rights Watch, the World Bank) began to systematically monitor 
the adverse impact of settlements’ expansion on the welfare of the 
Palestinian population. The role of Israeli hardliners in the dynamics of 
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the peace process, however, continued to stimulate research on the more 
activist and ideological segment of the settler population (Elor & Aran, 
1995; Sivan, 1995; Feige, 2001, 2002, 2013; Pedahzur & Perliger, 2009; 
Hirsch-Hoefler, Canetti, & Eiran, 2016) and its influence vis-à-vis the 
Israeli establishment and political culture (Shahak & Mezvinsky, 1999; 
Feige, 2009; Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde, 2020; Inbari, 2012; Pedahzur & 
McCarthy, 2015; Taub, 2010). 
All in all, this shift away from political geography and political 
economy contributed to flatten the image of the settler’s population and 
attribute excessive emphasis to the agency of settlers’ movement in Is-
raeli politics (for a similar critique see: Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 
2017; Dalsheim & Harel, 2009; Weiss, 2009). In the last two decades, 
several studies have challenged the idea that the settlers’ movement has 
been the primary engine of colonization, highlighting the role of the 
state as its main sponsor. Still, most have focused on the broader 
contexts of Israeli policies in the West Bank (e.g. Berda, 2017; Efrat, 
2006; Gordon, 2008; Handel, 2014; Weizman, 2007) and of the dy-
namics of Israeli state-building and democracy (e.g. Peled & Shafir, 
2002; Shenhav, 2012; Yiftachel, 2006), while the relatively few contri-
butions specifically addressing the ISP have instead followed established 
lines of inquiry by investigating the symbiosis between the settlers’ 
movement and the government (Eldar & Zertal, 2007; Gorenberg, 
2006). 
In the last few years, however, scholars have started to considerably 
broaden their analysis of ISP, focusing on the dynamics of the produc-
tion of space (Schwake, 2021a, Schwake, 2020a, Schwake, 2021b; 
Shoked, 2020; Abreek-Zubiedat & Nitzan-Shiftan, 2021; Rokem & 
Allegra, 2016; Yacobi & Pullan, 2014) on the heterogeneity of settlers 
population (Allegra, 2017; Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 2017; Dalsheim, 
2011; Harel, 2017; Hirschhorn, 2017), including studies on the haredi 
Fig. 1. Caption: Selected settlements in the West Bank. Source: (Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 2017): xii.  
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settler community (Rubin, 2015; Cahaner, 2017; Shoked, 2019); on the 
political economy of settlements’ proliferation (Allweil, 2020; Maggor, 
2015; Schwake 2020c; Schwake 2021c) and the labour relations with 
the Palestinians employed in the settlement’s economy (Farsakh, 2005; 
Paz-Fuchs & Ronen, 2017; Vickery, 2017; Siegman, 2018); on the 
environmental and infrastructural dimension of colonization (Braver-
man, 2021); and on the process of banalization of Jewish presence in the 
West Bank (Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 2017; Weiss, 2017), including 
deliberate settlers’ strategies in this respect (Grosglik, Handel, & Mon-
terescu, 2021; Handel, Rand, & Allegra, 2015; Isaac, 2018; McGonigle, 
2019; Monterescu & Handel, 2020). 
This paper builds on this recent growing body of literature. Through 
the paper, we argue that the lack of a specific focus on ISP as a state 
territorial strategy leaves several key questions unanswered: which 
factors account for ISP’s success in transforming the geography of Israel/ 
Palestine? Why did certain settlement patterns prevail over others? And 
finally, how can we reconcile the inherently ideological and ostensible 
strategic nature of Israel’s colonization of the West Bank with its 
mundane character and its appeal to non-ideological, run-of-the-mill 
Israelis? 
Against this background, adopting a state restructuring perspective 
to observe the ISP presents two advantages. First, the literature on state 
restructuring provides us with a general theoretical argument about the 
spatial and territorial nature of states, showing how states deploy 
“spatial strategies” on several different scales to “regulate, produce and 
reproduce configurations of social space” (Brenner, 1997, p. 280). At the 
same time, this literature is sensitive to the dynamics underlying the 
construction of local political legitimacy (see e.g. Pullan & Yacobi, 2017; 
Purcell & Nevins, 2005). The literature on state restructuring allows us 
to conceptualize the dynamics underlying the development of the ISP at 
the intersection of space, economy, and politics, and across different 
scales (global, national, local); to chart the interactions of many actors, 
both state planners, and private developers, as well as the various settler 
groups, across different governance arrangements; and to observe the 
dialectic between spatial policies and the inherited configuration of the 
physical and human landscape. In turn, we argue that post-1967 Isra-
el/Palestine represents a good case study to develop a clear sense of the 
relations between states, space, and territory. Mere reference to “Isra-
el/Palestine” alludes to a set of questions that can hardly be answered 
without conceiving territory “at once as a historically specific form of 
politico-spatial organization, as a key modality of modern statecraft and 
as a strategic dimension of modern politics” (Brenner & Elden, 2009, p. 
356). 
Second, this literature provides us with an empirical and historical 
description of the global process of neo-liberalization, which some au-
thors have defined in terms of a transition from the post-WWII 
“Keynesian Welfare State” to a new, neoliberal “Post-Keynesian 
Competition State” (Brenner, 2004; Brenner, Jessop, Jones, & MacLeod, 
2003; Cerny, 1997; Jessop, 2002). The concept alludes, among other 
things, to the transition toward a more market-oriented paradigm of 
economic development and welfare retrenchment; from “government to 
governance” and toward a more entrepreneurial stance in the public 
administration at the urban level (Harvey, 1989); toward the “metro-
politanization” of the national planning systems (see e.g. Brenner, 
2004). Israel’s political economy has followed a similar trajectory. 
During its first decades of existence, from its establishment in 1948 until 
the late-1970s, the Israeli state exerted a great deal of centralist control 
over matters of infrastructure and industrial development, foreign trade, 
economic investment, and the structuring and management of the labor 
market (Grinberg, 1991; Levi-Faur, 1998; Maggor, 2021). Israel’s wel-
fare state in this period was relatively robust, yet assured differential 
levels of decommodification to different social groups defined by 
ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship. This is because its origins, and 
important aspects of its continuing development, can be traced to the 
struggle to establish a Jewish presence in Palestine and to build up its 
territorial, demographic, and political base (Rosenhek, 1999; Shalev, 
1992). Starting in the late 1970s, much like everywhere else in the 
world, Israel’s embarked on a deep and far-reaching process of economic 
restructuring. This shift encompassed the implementation of neoliberal 
formulas that included: the deregulation of the labor market; liber-
alization of financial markets; lifting of restrictions on the movement of 
capital and goods; heightened involvement of foreign capital; privati-
zation of public infrastructure and assets; a dramatic decline in union-
ization and the decentralization of wage bargaining, and restrictive 
fiscal and monetary policies (Bassat, 2002; Kristal, 2013; Maron & 
Shalev, 2017; Paz-Fuchs, Mandelkern, & Galnoor, 2018; Shalev, 1998). 
It is often assumed that such neo-liberal reforms mark the retreat of the 
state from its historical position in the economic field (e.g. Four-
cade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002; Prasad, 2006). Other studies, however, 
describe state action in the neoliberal era not in terms of more or less 
state involvement in the economy, but rather as the qualitative change 
in the state’s mode of involvement and institutional configuration 
(Campbell, 2004; Maman & Rosenhek, 2012; Weiss, 1998). As we will 
show in this paper, the same can be said regarding Israel’s spatial 
development policies, particularly (but not exclusively) in regards to ISP 
and the role of the MoH. 
3. The political economy of Israel’s settlement policy 
In an article published in 1998 in the Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, Arie Shachar, one of the foremost Israeli 
planners and urban geographers, observed that “settlements established 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were rarely regarded [by Israeli plan-
ners] as an extension of the existing settlement system of Israel” and 
“their location and size were not determined according to accepted 
planning principles” (Shachar, 1998, p. 218). In his article, Shachar 
expressed the widely held notion that ideological and strategic consid-
erations represent the only link between Israel and the settlements, 
which otherwise exist in a separate administrative, socioeconomic and 
political space (Allegra, Handel, & Maggor, 2017). 
Contrary to this typical view, we wish to make two arguments in the 
following sub-sections. First, that the development of ISP has been 
consistent with broader changes in Israel’s spatial strategy between the 
1970s and the 1980s, implemented as part of a larger shift from a 
Fordist/Keynesian model to a post-Fordist/neoliberal one outlined 
above, which emphasized endogenous factors as the primary driver of 
territorial development policy. Thus, the policy of the MoH in the West 
Bank reflected this shift in their emphasis on metropolitan consolida-
tion, and in the idea that the government should use public policy to 
mobilize the energies of the private sector. Second, that the “metro-
politanization” of ISP has constituted a key vehicle for the consolidation 
of the political legitimacy of Israel’s control over the West Bank vis-à-vis 
a much wider Israeli audience than that of the political-ideological 
constituency of “Greater Israel”. 
3.1. A paradigm shift in regional development strategies: from 
“Keynesian” to “post-Keynesian” settlement policy 
The post-war Keynesian model of state management was by and 
large based on the “correspondence between the national economy as 
the primary object of economic management, and the nation-state as the 
primary political scale on which economic management was conducted 
and social welfare was delivered” (Brenner, Jessop, Jones, & MacLeod, 
2003, p. 4). In parallel, regional development policies were designed to 
achieve spatially balanced economic growth, with public authorities 
investing considerable resources for the development of economically 
peripheral areas. 
The original outlook of Israeli planning policies starting in the 1950s 
largely aligned with these global trends. National development policies 
were aimed at reaching a more balanced spatial distribution, socio- 
economic regional integration, and dispersal of the industry to the pe-
ripheral regions. The goal of these efforts was to foster the development 
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of Israel’s peripheries and redistributing productive capacities evenly 
across the national territory. A core principle in this respect was the idea 
of “population dispersal”. The most well-known examples of population 
dispersal were the so-called “development towns”, built in the Galilee 
and the Negev regions during the 1950s under the auspices of the Sharon 
plan (Efrat, 1988; Shachar, 1971). The same logic guided the era’s in-
dustrial policies, which provided generous state subsidies to manufac-
tures that were willing to operate in peripheral regions. These policies 
had a significant effect on the national pattern of capital investment, 
infrastructure, housing, and public services (Shachar (1998), p. 213; see 
also Gradus, Razin, & Krakover, 1993; Levi-Faur, 1998; Maggor, 2021). 
This approach was also initially applied after 1967 in the conquered 
territories. Examples include the Allon plan, which stressed the creation 
of small agricultural settlements along the Jordanianian border (Hasson 
& Gosenfeld, 1980), the early establishment of settlements in the Gaza 
area, and the grandiose plans for the nearby port town of Yamit 
(Abreek-Zubiedat & Nitzan-Shiftan, 2020, 2021), and through the set-
tlement activity inspired by the territorial maximalism of movements 
such as the national-religious Gush Emunim or influential politicians 
like Ariel Sharon, which supported the establishment of settlements in 
relatively remote sites to strengthen frontier areas (see Benvenisti & 
Khayat, 1988, pp. 99–104). 
Starting with the mid-1970s, in the context of a global crisis in the 
world economy, this model began to be replaced by the new, post- 
Fordist model of the “post-Keynesian competition state”. State spatial 
planning became increasingly fragmented, and no longer presumed that 
economic growth could occur in a geographically equilibrated manner. 
The regional policy was no longer oriented towards the even redistri-
bution of productive capacities across the national territory, but rather 
towards the “preservation and development of ‘endogenous‘ regional 
and urban growth potentials” (Brenner, 1997, p. 281). 
The same shift took place in Israel in the same period (Schwake, 
2020c, 2020b). Since the mid-1970s, Israeli planners abandoned the 
principle of population dispersal in support of an approach that 
emphasized the concentration of economic activities in a limited num-
ber of core areas, and the provision of the infrastructures needed to lay 
the ground for market-oriented development. It was in this context that 
new towns such as Modi’in (located about 30 km from both Tel-Aviv and 
Jerusalem) were erected and that the massive expansion of existing lo-
calities such as Rosh HaAyin and Rishon Lezion (within the metropolitan 
region of Tel Aviv) or Beth-Shemesh (about 30 km from Jerusalem) took 
place. This outlook found its ultimate expression in the national statu-
tory and strategic plans approved in the 1990s, more specifically the 
National Master Plan (NMP 31), which was published and approved by 
the Israeli government in 1992, and the Israel 2020 plan, which was 
completed in 1997 (see Razin, 1990; Shachar, 1998). In this respect, the 
creation of large suburban settlements in the West Bank was coherent 
with the abandonment of previous models of “population dispersal” in 
favor of an approach based on the potential for “endogenous” growth 
and the intrinsic advantages of location, and a market-oriented logic of 
development emphasizing economic rationality, efficiency, and feasi-
bility, metropolitan consolidation. As Gabriel Schwake (2020a, 2021c) 
has recently shown, these new policies of territorial development were 
deployed on both sides of the Green Line. This new phase of Israel’s 
settlement policy had therefore unique features that differentiate it from 
earlier Israeli and Zionist spatial development models (see e.g. Benve-
nisti, 1984; Schwake, 2020c), and did not represent the mere continu-
ation of previous trends. Indeed, at least to a certain extent, these 
developments run counter to preferences for “ideological”, “agricul-
tural” or “strategic” models of settlement – which preferred the estab-
lishment of new communities in relatively remote locations (Maggor, 
2015). Whereas these various settlement models did persist after the 
1980s, and still exist to this day, the suburban model we focus on in this 
paper has remained the leading force behind the continued expansion of 
the settlement enterprise. 
3.2. Settlement policy as metropolitan consolidation 
The West Bank offered vast resources for this reorientation of Israeli 
spatial and development policies. The area constituted, from a planning 
point of view, an ideal reservoir of land for the metropolitan expansion 
of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and particularly in the light of the growing 
demand for affordable and quality housing (Benvenisti, Abu-Zayed, & 
Rubinstein, 1986; Gonen, 1995; Portugali, 1991) – a need which had 
been exacerbated by the retrenchment in public spending on housing in 
Israel proper (Carmon, 2001). The existence of such spatial and eco-
nomic potential was not lost on senior bureaucrats in Israel’s MoH. In 
1982, an internal committee in the MoH, appointed by the 
director-general of the ministry, Asher Weiner, recommended concen-
trating development efforts in settlements with high-growth potential 
located in the metropolitan belt of Tel Aviv. The settlements of Ariel, 
Karnei Shomron, Alfei Menashe, and Emmanuel were chosen “in view of 
their location and power of attraction,” while remote localities with 
“low development potential” remained under the control of the rural 
administration (November 1982, Israel State Archive, thereafter ISA, 
ISA/GL 109/14903/1). 
The principles and vision guiding the MoH’s decision were outlined 
most clearly by Asher Weiner. Speaking at a plenary session of the 
annual meeting of the Israeli Geographical Association on December 7, 
1983, the MoH’s director-general explained that one of the main reasons 
for which the Ministry regarded the West Bank as a preferred area for 
development was the “proximity of certain parts of the region [ …] to 
the greater Tel Aviv metropolitan area”. As for “the distribution of 
development in the region”, he explained that instead of developing “as 
many settlements as possible which […] will be small,” and “relatively 
expensive to establish and maintain”, the MoH preferred “the estab-
lishment of larger, relatively few urban settlements that would be cost- 
effective by establishing a system of services […] with a relatively low 
per capita cost of maintenance.” A similar logic was followed with 
regards to the issue of employment centers. In this regard, relying on 
already existing employment centers in the core regions of Israel Proper 
permitted the MoH to focus its efforts mainly on the development of 
residential areas. In his talk, Weiner outlined in great detail the MoH’s 
vision for the “development of several urban centers […] in which 
thousands of people will live within the next twenty years.” These, he 
explained, will serve as “large hubs” that would enjoy “comprehensive 
development” along with “a national and regional infrastructure sys-
tem” that would ensure “a high level of services”, and would be inte-
grated with “Israeli centers of activity” in the already developed cities 
within the Green Line (December 1983, ISA/RG 109/GL/14616/8). 
In the case of Jerusalem, the metropolitanization of the settlement 
policy had been anticipated in the early 1970s by the Israeli plans for the 
“new neighborhoods” built in the newly expanded municipal boundaries 
of the city – which included about 70 km2 of West Bank territory 
(compared to the 6.5 km2 of the former Jordanian municipality). Since 
the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, the MoH and the government 
had pursued a model of “dispersed” urban development (Faludi, 1997; 
Schweid, 1986) based on the construction of the first belt of satellite 
neighborhoods (Ramat Eshkol, French Hill, Neve Ya’akov, Gilo, Talpiot, 
Ramot). In the 1970s, two new development plans – “satellite town 
north” and “satellite town south” (later renamed “Mevohot Adumim” 
and “Mevohot Etzion”, respectively) – were prepared by the ministry to 
extend the metropolitan region of Jerusalem both northward and 
southward while using new settlements (Geva Binyamin, Kokhav Ya’a-
kov, Beitar Illit) to create a “significant territorial extension” of the city’s 
outer circle. These plans aimed not only to strengthen the Jerusalem 
region but to integrate it with the central region of the state using three 
new central arteries (interview with the MoH’s former Head of Programs 
Department, February 2012). The birth of Ma’ale Adummim, Givat 
Ze’ev, and Efrat outside the municipal borders – as well as later devel-
opment in the 1980s – followed the same pattern. Indeed, senior plan-
ners of the MoH describe the various phases of development around the 
M. Allegra and E. Maggor                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Political Geography 92 (2022) 102513
6
city’s core in terms of an overall process of strengthening of a metro-
politan region through the creation of a Jewish hinterland east of the 
city (interviews with the director of the MoH’s Department of Devel-
opment Programs, Jerusalem District, November 2010 and former Head 
of the Program Department, February 2012; see also Shlay & Rosen, 
2010). 
Vast amounts of government resources were therefore channeled to 
the region through the MoH to foster urban and regional development 
and integrate selected areas of the West Bank into Israel’s core regions. 
In 1984, the annual public expenditure in the region almost tripled 
(Benvenisti, 1986, p. 56) and so did the amount of housing construction 
(February 19, 1980, ISA/GL 109/8325/4; October 2, 1985, ISA/GL 
109/14616/11). In 1984 the West Bank region enjoyed the largest 
concentration of publicly funded housing construction in the entire 
country, with a rate of almost 30% of the total public construction 
(Benvenisti, 1986, p. 52). This figure was a result not only of the 
increasing investment in the region but of the decline in investment in 
housing and construction in the state’s peripheral regions – a direct 
consequence of the state’s abandonment of the principle of population 
dispersal and balanced spatial distribution. While the data above refers 
to the West Bank as a uniform region (excluding East Jerusalem), a 
closer analysis of the allocation of resources highlights the dispropor-
tional investment of public resources in settlements located in the 
metropolitan areas of Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem. A summary of construc-
tion data for the years 1979–1984 (once again, excluding East Jerusa-
lem) shows that out of 11,000 new residential units built in the 
settlements during this period, 8000 (73%) were located in areas of high 
demand near Tel-Aviv or Jerusalem (ISA/GL 109/8325/4; ISA/GL 
109/14616/11). 
A large part of the MoH’s budget was allocated for the construction 
of the infrastructure needed to create and maintain a single metropolitan 
network. For example, in 1983 more than half of the total spending on 
“infrastructure in preparation for construction and population of new 
settlement neighborhoods” was allocated to four large settlements 
located in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan (Alfei Menashe, Immanuel, Ariel, 
and Karnei Shomron) and two large settlements located just outside 
Jerusalem (Ma’ale Adumim and Givat Ze’ev; Kiryat Arba, near Hebron, 
was also included in the list; ISA/GL 109/14674/4). The largest in-
vestment was directed to fund the planning and construction of an 
intercity highway system, meant to provide “rapid, secure access” from 
urban centers in the West Bank to employment and commercial areas 
located in the coastal plain and Jerusalem (December 1983, ISA/GL 
109/14616/8). Examples of these arteries were the Trans-Samaria 
highway (Road N. 5, today one of Israel’s largest highways cutting 
through the West Bank and the 6 km highway linking Ma’ale Adummim 
to Jerusalem). The following decades have seen even larger investments 
in roads, as hundreds of kilometers of secure highways now link set-
tlements to Israel proper, further incorporating the settlements to Is-
rael’s heartland (Gourji & Bassok, 2003; Shezaf, 2020). 
The result of this paradigm shift is visible forty years later. Metro-
politanization paved the way for bringing tens of thousands of Israeli 
Jews into the West Bank. By 1985, the population concentrated in urban 
blocks in proximity to the Green Line accounted for close to 75 percent 
of the entire settler population residing in the West Bank outside Jeru-
salem (Benvenisti, 1987: 47), a figure that eventually climbed to 80–85 
percent and has remained constant to this day (Allegra, 2013, 2016). 
Indeed, already in 1991 the Israeli geographer Juval Portugali noted 
that the Jewish colonization of the West Bank had been “mostly part of 
the metropolitan expansion of the Tel-Aviv region and the metropoli-
tanization of Jerusalem” (Portugali, 1991, p. 33; see also Allegra, 2013; 
Newman, 1996; Newman & Portugali, 1987). Needless to say, the fact 
that suburban settlements were built “in view of their location and 
power of attraction”, and with the goal of “metropolitan consolidation” 
did not make things any better for the Palestinian population. On the 
contrary, the development of settlements such as Ariel or Ma’ale 
Adumim has proved to be especially harmful to the territorial contiguity 
of Palestinian areas (including access to Jerusalem) and for the prospect 
of a “two-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More broadly, 
residential, and infrastructural construction has imposed significant 
barriers on the development of Palestinian communities and constitutes 
a single “gating complex” (Handel, 2014) that severely limits Pales-
tinians’ access to land and resources. 
3.3. Settlement policy and public-private partnerships 
The policies of the MoH were directed not only to individual settlers 
but also to the Israeli business community; indeed, the creation of 
public-private partnerships was one of the main tenets of the new policy 
paradigm. Nowhere was this new balance of state-market relations more 
widespread than in the realm of housing development. Whereas in the 
context of Fordist, spatial-Keynesianism the state both provided the 
necessary capital and carried out the lion’s share of development efforts 
(Carmon, 2001; Gradus, Razin, & Krakover, 1993; Shachar, 1998), these 
new development strategies involved a diminished role for the state in 
the realm of actual construction, but a more significant role in incen-
tivizing private capital investment by planning, providing subsidized 
mortgages and tax breaks, as well as in upgrading infrastructures (Car-
mon, 2001; Maron, 2015). In this period, in line with the direct, 
supply-side spatial tactics of post-Keynesianism, key state agencies such 
as the MoH began establishing partnerships with leading contractors, 
real-estate investors, and first-tier construction firms, to foster urban 
and regional development in targeted areas (Margalit, 2014). 
The West Bank was no exception in this sense. Following the suc-
cessful involvement of private-sector construction firms in the devel-
opment of settlements in East Jerusalem (Yacobi & Pullan, 2017), in the 
early 1980s government planners believed that other “areas of high 
demand” in the West Bank were now also “ripe for an increased share of 
private capital investment” (Benvenisti, 1984, p. 56). In a letter 
endorsing public-private partnerships addressed to the prime minister, 
the finance minister, the minister of housing, and the MoH’s 
director-general, Deputy Defence Minister Mordachi Zippory com-
mented that: “the extensive involvement of private construction firms 
[in the West Bank]” could contribute to “relieving the burden of state 
agencies and resources in the advancement of such important national 
[development] projects”, and “provide momentum for developing the 
peripheral areas of both the coastal plain and Jerusalem metropolitan 
areas” (1981, ISA/GL 109/14616/8). In a memorandum sent to the 
Minister of Housing David Levy and the Director-General of the MoH, 
Asher Weiner, on September 3rd, 1981, Yossi Margalit, the managing 
director of the Rural Construction and New Settlements Administration 
wrote: “There is great interest in the part of entrepreneurs, construction 
firms and other agencies […] in the allocation of land for construction 
[in the new settlements]”. “To the extent that the conditions for assis-
tance in place today are guaranteed,” he added, “[it will be possible] to 
expand construction [in the region] far beyond its current scope” 
(ISA/GL 109/8487/10). Indeed soon, most government incentives to 
private construction firms, such as dramatically low land prices (only 
five percent of the estimated land value, compared to eighty percent in 
Israel proper) – offered across the West Bank but most valuable in areas 
of high demand – were introduced and institutionalized in official 
government decisions (ISA/GL 109/14616/9; see also Ha’aretz, 
December 6, 1982, p. 9). 
In 1983, Minister of Housing David Levy could declare in an inter-
view to Yedioth Aharonoth that the MoH was in the midst of a “large, 
silent revolution” which consisted mainly of “getting private firms and 
entrepreneurs to invest private capital, alongside investment from the 
government”. This approach confirmed the minster, “has already proved 
itself [successful] in the settlements of Ma’ale Adumim, Ariel, Emma-
nuel, Efrat, Karnei Shomron, Givat Ze’ev, Alfei Menashe,” – all located in 
the West Bank’s areas of high demand (Yediot Aharonot, January 14, 
1983, p. 8). In the same vein, in 1983 Weiner expressed the MoH’s desire 
to provide “assistance” and “subsidies” to construction firms and private 
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developers who will come to build in these areas (December 1983, ISA/ 
RG 109/GL/14616/8). 
More subtly, this partnership also inaugurated a qualitative shift in 
the division of labor between state and market. In the early 1980s, the 
public participation ratio in planned investments in the region 
(1983–1986) was estimated at 60% of the total capital investment. A 
closer look, however, illuminates crucial aspects of this new division of 
labor: while public spending still funded the majority of “settlement 
infrastructure” (62%), “industry” (73%), “community services” (73%), 
and the entire cost of “roads, water, and communications”, private 
capital funded the majority (67%) of housing construction (Benvenisti, 
1984, p. 56). In other words, while public-private cooperation still 
required significant public funding and involvement, it allowed the state 
to take a secondary role regarding funding the actual housing con-
struction, as most of the capital investment needed was provided by the 
private sector. This new division of labor allowed the state to relieve the 
burden of fully funding all development efforts in the settlements – thus 
more easily abiding neo-liberal prescriptions for “fiscal responsibility” – 
while still maintaining relative autonomy and control over the general 
process. As the former head of the Programs Department in the MoH 
explained, the MoH’s control over the general planning stages and the 
construction of the preliminary infrastructure “without which, no new 
neighborhood could be built” allowed the state to retain the final say 
regarding all new development efforts (interview with the former head 
of the MoH’s Programs Department, February 2012). 
The state’s financial and institutional support of settlement devel-
opment in prime, high demand areas, was intended not only to produce 
new, affordable housing as argued above but also to address problems of 
capital accumulation that concerned the private construction sector 
(Allweil, 2020, p. 79; Maggor, 2015, pp. 153-154). Indeed, given the set 
of favorable conditions provided by the government, it is not surprising 
that these new public-private partnerships were also enthusiastically 
endorsed by leading members of the private sector. One of the strongest 
advocates of this policy was David Stern, a former right-wing politician 
turned businessman. In an interview marking his new appointment as 
President of the peak organization of Israel’s real-estate sector, Stern 
referred to the West Bank as “a large reserve of land” and acknowledged 
that “the blessed activity carried out in this area [by the government] 
had [ …] opened the way for large scale settlement of hundreds and 
thousands of new families in The West Bank.” (The Contractor and 
Builder, issue 213, August 1982). All in all, state investments in the West 
Bank had an unprecedented influence on sales made by private con-
struction firms, to the point that in 1984 the newspaper Yediot Aharonot 
could conclude that “construction beyond the Green Line had saved the 
building sector from a serious crisis”, and that “were it not for building 
in [the West Bank], a market that most private companies have pene-
trated this year – we would have witnessed a housing crisis of unprec-
edented proportions” (Yediot Aharonot, 1 January 1984, p. 18). 
3.4. Settlement policy as a vehicle of political legitimacy 
We have detailed so far how the trajectory of the ISP has reflected 
some key paradigmatic shifts in Israel’s territorial development strate-
gies – from a Fordist/Keynesian model to a post-Fordist/neoliberal one. 
The literature on state restructuring, however, also alerts us that, in any 
process of state rescaling, state actors must also “reproduce the political 
legitimacy of the power relations between ruler and ruled”, as “[c]iti-
zens’ political support is […] conditioned by a contingent, differenti-
ated, and changing set of expectations[, and] the state must meet some 
combination of those expectations sufficiently to maintain the overall 
political support of citizens” (Purcell & Nevins, 2005, p. 216). Given the 
controversial character of Israel’s control of the West Bank (and its 
considerable, long-term implications for the Israeli society), we might 
therefore ask: how did the ISP contribute to reproducing the political 
legitimacy of the state vis-à-vis the expanding Jewish presence in the 
territories occupied after 1967? 
The literature on Israel’s settlement policy (and indeed, most of the 
contributions on the spatial and territorial side of Israeli policies in the 
West Bank) has traditionally emphasized the ideological component of 
ISP’s legitimacy. To be sure, influential sections of Israeli society and key 
members of the political establishment had always regarded Israel’s 
control over the West Bank as the fulfillment of Zionism’s historical 
trajectory, and a strategic asset for the defense of the territorial integrity 
of the state (as in the logic of “defensible borders”). After 1967, Israel’s 
decision “not to decide” (Ranta, 2015) on the future of territories opened 
therefore a window of opportunities for the advocates of “greater Israel” 
to call for an aggressive expansionist agenda in the West Bank and 
channel significant public resources into the colonization of the West 
Bank. We argue, however, that ideological and security imperatives 
were essential but insufficient in fully legitimizing the proliferation of 
settlements before the wider Israeli public. In this respect, the “post--
Keynesian” and suburban character that the ISP assumed in the late 
1970s and early 1980s represents a crucial factor in bringing on board 
sectors of the Israeli society that had been largely uninterested in the 
religious-nationalist or strategic value of colonization; and in forging 
broad coalitions of actors in support of settlements proliferation. 
Without the growing support of these constituencies, we argue, it is hard 
to imagine that the settlements would have grown to their current size or 
enjoy the kind of legitimation they receive from the Israeli public. This is 
especially true regarding the large ‘settlements blocs’, where most of the 
settler population resides and around which there is strong public 
consensus. 
A first and rather obvious vehicle for enhancing the legitimacy of the 
ISP has been represented by Israel’s huge investments in the West Bank, 
e.g. through subsidized mortgages, infrastructures, and services.1 The 
role of the Israeli state as a major financial sponsor of the settlements has 
been widely recognized (Efrat, 2006; Hever, 2010; Peled & Shafir, 
2002). Yet, this involvement is usually interpreted simply as a strategic 
device used to advance ethnonational or strategic imperatives with 
economic means. While there is, of course, an element of truth to this 
view, it is not in itself a sufficient explanation as to why the settlements 
became such an attractive location for the broad Israeli population. The 
emergence of a broader political consensus around ISP depended to a 
large extent on the way subsidies could be ingrained into a new set of 
development policies based on the paradigm of endogenous growth and 
metropolitanization. As demonstrated above, this shift was a result of 
broader socio-economic and political imperatives such as addressing 
social demands for affordable housing and creating a new opportunity 
for profit-making for the private sector. Although subsidized mortgages 
and tax breaks were available throughout the West Bank, suburban 
settlements were particularly attractive for large numbers of ordinary 
Israelis and the real-estate industry, insofar as the significant financial 
and fiscal benefits added to their decisive locational advantages – a 
condition that David Newman appropriately termed “double centrality” 
(Newman, 1996). Especially since the 1980s, the government also 
encouraged industrial development in the occupied territories. All 
1 Starting in the 1980s, the MoH heavily subsidized housing costs in the 
settlements. In June 1982, for example, a plan to assist the “acquisition of 
apartments in urban and community settlements in [the West Bank]” was 
launched, offering subsidized loans and generous mortgage repayment schemes 
(June 1982, ISA/GL 109/14616/1). As a result of this plan, settlers enjoyed 
mortgages and grants between 30% and 50% larger than what potential 
homeowners could receive in developing towns within Israel. Together with 
subsidized land prices for contractors, these benefits resulted in potential 
buyers enjoying significantly lower prices in the settlements, when compared 
with similar apartments in developed Israeli cities like Jerusalem, Kfar-Saba or 
Petach-Tikva. During this period, the MoH also funded the construction of 
many public institutions including: schools, kindergartens, synagogues, day- 
care centers, community centers, as well as various infrastructure projects 
that included sewages, waterworks, electricity and communication lines 
(Maggor 2015). 
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settlements, including those just a short drive to Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, 
were awarded an ‘A’ development zone status, entitling them to 
expanded benefits on par with localities in Israel’s most remote pe-
riphery. These benefits were greatly attractive, particularly in industrial 
zones within commuting distance of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. For 
example, the Barkan industrial zone, near the town of Ariel, became a 
major magnet for publicly supported industrial investment in Israel 
(Gradus, Razin, & Krakover, 1993, p. 226–227). Attractive housing 
opportunities remain to this day an important catalyst to inward 
migration to West Banks settlements, particularly those located in the 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv metropolitan areas. In fact, a recent study 
(Ben-Shahar, Gabriel, & Golan, 2019) has found that, in the period 
2000–2015, economic factors remain salient in households’ determi-
nation of relocating to the West Bank regardless of religious belief or 
ideological orientation, and that the price gap between identical housing 
units in Israel and the West Bank remains substantial. 
A second vehicle for ISP’s political legitimacy was represented by its 
demographics. As we have seen, the “double centrality” of suburban 
settlements attracted tens of thousands of Israeli to the West Bank. 
Furthermore, as Daniel Gutwein has argued, large investments beyond 
the Green Line became a compensatory mechanism that supplied “par-
tial substitutes to the commodified services that [Israel’s lower classes] 
could not afford [in Israel proper]” (Gutwein, 2004), and whose relative 
size in the population was gradually increasing (Dahan, 2002; Kristal, 
2013). Starting in the 1980s, and throughout the last three decades, a 
growing number of Israel’s most marginalized groups found refuge in 
the settlements. Indeed, recent scholarship has found the settler popu-
lation includes the large number of mizrahim (i.e. Jews of African or 
Middle Eastern descent, Dalsheim, 2008; Gillis, 2009), haredim (i.e. the 
so-called "ultra-orthodox Jews", (Cahaner, 2017; Rubin, 2015), and 
immigrants from the former Soviet Union (H. Weiss, 2011). The process 
of rapid expansion of Israel’s metropolitan centers into the West Bank 
made the settler population more diverse in terms of ethnicity, religi-
osity, political orientations, and more broadly reflective of Israeli soci-
ety. With time, these groups not only became the main clients of ISP but 
also provided the political support required for maintaining it. This was 
carried out both locally, through the leadership of municipal authorities, 
and on a national level, through these groups’ representative parties in 
parliament – for example Shas and Yahadut Hatorah for the mizrahi and 
haredi population, or Yisrael Beiteinu for immigrants from the former 
Soviet Union. 
The diversity of the settler population hints at a third, key factor of 
ISP’s political legitimacy, i.e. the fact that suburban settlements became 
the territorial platform for the establishment of broad coalitions of ac-
tors supporting the ISP. The early settlement models had resulted in the 
creation of relatively small and homogeneous communities, such as the 
socialist kibbutzim and the national-religious yishuv kheilatim, which 
served the purpose of the “redemption of the land” and catered to a 
relatively restricted public of committed pioneers. Suburban settle-
ments, on the contrary, constituted at the same time a vehicle of upward 
social mobility; an appropriate planning answer to the overcrowding of 
inner cities; a channel to effectively allocate public resources destined to 
the West Bank; and an expanding, profit-making business enterprise. 
Each of these rationales for suburban colonization appealed to specific 
constituencies and groups (e.g. the poor, the upwardly-mobile middle 
class, the business community, civil servants and planning professionals, 
etc.; see e.g. Schwake, 2020b, Schwake, 2021c); each contributed to 
strengthen the consensus around ISP and make it relatively 
non-controversial (Allegra, 2013; Allegra & Handel, 2017). Many of 
these groups were not interested in the ideological value of colonization 
and looked at the settlements in purely financial-logistic terms, or as 
gated safe spaces, which protect and preserve a community of peers 
(Allegra, 2017; Yiftachel, 2003). For some, such as the haredim, the 
whole concept of colonization had long been dangerously near to reli-
gious anathema – at least until some key features of suburban coloni-
zation (e.g. affordability, proximity to main haredi religious and 
communal centers, opportunities for self-segregation) brought them to 
move en masse to the West Bank. As a result, haredi parties have shifted 
their position regarding the future of the settlement enterprise. Indeed, 
as Lee Cahaner has shown, while the haredi population did not arrive at 
the WB as ideological supporters of the settlements; their growing 
involvement in the ISP has been paralleled by the embrace of territorial 
maximalism similar to the traditional position of the national-religious 
right (Cahaner, 2017, see also: Gordon & Cohen, 2012, pp. 12–14). In 
other words, while the underlying motivation for settling beyond the 
Green Line may well have been its urgent and growing need for 
affordable housing, this process has resulted in a general rightward turn 
of the haredi society. 
Finally, the existence of suburban settlements greatly contributed to 
making the transition to the West Bank seamless for ordinary Israelis. 
While Israel’s control over the West Bank remains problematic to this 
day for a considerable part of the Israeli public, very few Israelis would 
have considered any withdrawal from East Jerusalem even in the 
aftermath of the war; the proliferation of settlements in the city and its 
immediate environs was far less controversial – indeed, some have 
suggested that this is the reason why settlements in Jerusalem (the so- 
called “new neighborhoods”) have remained by and largely invisible 
in the scholarly production on ISP (Abu-Lughod, 1982; Allegra, 2013). 
Infrastructural investments by the MoH resulted in the integration of 
large portions of the West Bank into the urban fabric of Israel’s main 
metropolitan centers. Urban planning and architecture further contrib-
uted to the blurring the Green Line: consistently with contemporary 
development of housing policies throughout Israel (Carmon, 2001, pp. 
194–195), these suburban settlements were the expression of a new, 
postmodern outlook based on the variety of spaces, the search for a local 
architectural language, and deeper integration between the built areas 
and the surrounding natural environment; and cutting-edge architec-
tural and planning techniques were employed in the construction of 
suburban settlements (see e.g. Allegra, 2013, pp 499-503; Weizman, 
2007, pp. 111–116 on Ma’ale Adumim; Yacobi & Pullan, 2017 on French 
Hill). The result was that Israelis could live in settlements “did not look 
like settlements” (Kratsman & Ginsburg, 2017). 
4. Conclusions 
Israel’s settlement policy has represented a powerful engine of the 
transformation of the political geography of Israel/Palestine. This paper 
has made two distinct and interrelated arguments in this respect. In the 
first place, our analysis shows how settlement’s expansion was part of a 
broader process of state restructuring, and a shift in the state’s spatial 
development policies, from a nationally-oriented development model to 
a more targeted, and regionally focused metropolitan development 
outlook. The trajectory of the ISP was therefore intimately connected to 
the dynamics of development of Israel’s main metropolitan centers, and 
contemporary trends toward marketization and suburbanization in the 
Israeli society and beyond. The ISP, in this respect, has not been an 
exceptional phenomenon contradictory to other trends in Israeli society 
– something happening (socially, politically, and geographically) 
“outside” Israel. In the second place, we have argued that this shift has 
greatly contributed to expanding the audience of (and the consensus 
around) the ISP, thereby strengthening the political legitimacy of Is-
rael’s control on the West Bank. As we have argued elsewhere (Allegra, 
Handel, & Maggor, 2017) a key success factor of the ISP has been pre-
cisely its banal, mundane character, epitomized by the suburban set-
tlements in the area of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, which contributes to 
obscure the political nature of colonization and made it relatively 
non-controversial for broad sectors of the Israeli Jewish society. 
Neither of these statements should obscure the fact that Israel’s 
colonization of the West Bank remains an inherently political process: 
the development of ISP was made possible because the Israeli govern-
ment decided to open the Palestinian territories to colonization after 
1967, and because of the existence of a strong and influent current of 
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territorial maximalism in Israeli politics. On the contrary, our study 
demonstrates that the neoliberal logic is not necessarily contrary to the 
pursuit of ethnonational goals (see also (Clarno, 2017; Schwake, 2021c; 
Weiss, 2011); rather, we argue that pragmatic choices are shaped by 
prevailing societal and economic imperatives have been paramount to 
the successful development of the ISP. We further argue that the met-
ropolitanization of ISP, rather than depoliticizing colonization, has 
contributed to defining the “rules of the game” for successful strategies 
of settlement expansion. Finally, whatever the factors underlying the 
success of ISP, its consequences are inherently political, and will remain 
so for the foreseeable future: the colonization of the West Bank happens 
at the expenses of the Palestinian population, for whom the suburban-
ization of ISP further contributed to truncating the Palestinian metro-
politan network centered on Jerusalem, and represents a continuous 
source of territorial conflicts and struggles. As Gordon and Cohen have 
argued, while violent actions tend to receive more media attention, the 
inflow of settlers from Israel to the West Bank represents in fact “the 
most insidious kind of unilateralism in the conflict” (Gordon & Cohen, 
2012, p. 11) because it undermines the possibility of a Palestinian polity. 
At the same time, the study of Israel’s settlement policy provides us 
with useful insights on current debates developing on the dynamics 
production of territory: i.e. on “how particular territorial settlements are 
produced, and how states operate in ways that normalize and perpetuate 
this spatial order of things” (Elden, 2010, p. 760) and of the political 
dynamics of state restructuring (Purcell & Nevins, 2005). Our work on 
the ISP addresses three key dimensions of inquiry on territory (Brenner 
& Elden, 2009): the multi-faceted nature of the production of territory; 
the deployment of state territorial strategies; and the “territory effect”. 
First, the dynamic and contested nature of territorial configurations 
in Israel/Palestine allows us to see the dynamic of the production of 
territory at work. It shows us how territory is a bundle of practices (e.g. 
the flow of settlers/commuters across the Green Line), abstractions (e.g. 
the paradigms of endogenous regional and urban growth as resulting in 
Israeli policy documents and maps), and material objects/in-
frastructures (e.g. the built structure of the settlements and their infra-
structure); and how new territorial configurations emerge from the 
interaction between inherited and emergent geographies. In this respect, 
our work contributes to critical urban theory and the stream of settler- 
colonial studies (Yiftachel, 2016; Porter & Yiftachel, 2019; see Barry 
& Agyeman, 2020 for a review) by showing how parallel forces and 
discourses contribute to shaping the nature of urbanization, and espe-
cially, in this case, concerning the expansion of the metropolises of Tel 
Aviv and Jerusalem. Second, conceiving the ISP as a territorial strategy 
gives us a more comprehensive picture of the role of Israeli policy-
making in reshaping inherited territorial configurations. It describes the 
key role of state institutions, such as the MoH, as the center of gravity of 
the ISP, while at the same time showing how state strategies both 
accommodated and shaped other societal and economic imperatives 
through a variety of policy instruments and the mobilization of wider 
coalitions of actors.2 It describes its long-term drivers and consequences, 
but also points to its grey areas, its contested character, its incom-
pleteness – indeed, the case of ISP shows how the production of territory 
does not necessarily imply the homogenization of state spaces, but can 
instead systematically rely on the production of difference (Ford, 1999): 
over more than five decades, the ISP has not created a new international 
border, but rather a patchwork of jurisdictions and special status areas. 
Third, the case of ISP is a particularly stark illustration of the “territory 
effect”– i.e., “the state’s tendency, through its territorial form, to natu-
ralize (at once to mask and to normalize) its own transformative, 
intensely patterning effects upon sociospatial relations” (Brenner & 
Elden, 2009, p. 354). The ISP has not only remodeled previous territorial 
configurations but also naturalized new ones, consolidating the political 
legitimacy of Israel’s control over the West Bank. The establishment of 
suburban settlements has thus been paramount in bringing on board 
sectors of the Israeli population that did not necessarily partake the ISP’s 
underlying strategic and ideological rationale. 
Finally, it is only fair to recognize that this study is by and large 
limited to the examination of the Israeli side of the settlement equation, 
and specifically of certain drivers and mechanisms of Israeli policy-
making in regards to the ISP. These limitations implicitly call for a sig-
nificant extension of scope and breadth of the research on ISP; 
theoretically, through an engagement with other key contributions in 
the field of political economy and geography (e.g. on territorial 
competitiveness and locational policies, gated urban developments, and 
splintering urbanism); methodologically, through systematic data 
collection at a macro level as well as historical and ethnographic 
research; thematically, through the analysis of the socio-economic fea-
tures of settlers population, the dynamics of political bargaining and 
patronage underlying the development of settlements, and their role as 
spatial interfaces between the Jewish and the Palestinian population of 
the West Bank. 
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